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@@ -377,7 +377,22 @@ spec:
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firmware:
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bootloader:
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efi:
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secureBoot: true
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# 2026-05-08: SecureBoot=false during initial install. With SecureBoot
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# enabled, OVMF's BdsDxe times out reading Boot0001 from the SCSI
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# CDROM ("BdsDxe: failed to start Boot0001 ... Time out") before the
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# EFI bootloader signature can verify against the OVMF VARS trust DB.
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# KubeVirt's `/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd` template doesn't
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# appear to include the Microsoft KEK/DB by default, so signed
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# Windows EFI bootloaders fail validation. Disabling SecureBoot lets
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# OVMF skip the chain check and boot directly. This is acceptable for
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# a CI runner — TPM 2.0 is still emulated (`tpm: {}` below) so
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# BitLocker / Hyper-V / WSL still work.
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# When the operator wants SecureBoot back, the path is:
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# 1. Custom-build OVMF_VARS.fd with Microsoft KEK/DB enrolled
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# 2. Mount it into the VM via firmware.bootloader.efi.persistent
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# 3. Set secureBoot: true again
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# Tracked separately from the install unblock.
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secureBoot: false
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devices:
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tpm: {} # Non-persistent vTPM — sufficient for runner; no BitLocker
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disks:
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@@ -396,10 +411,22 @@ spec:
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# Confirmed via debug pod: PVC content IS a real bootable ISO9660
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# (file: "ISO 9660 CD-ROM filesystem data ... (bootable)"), so the
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# only bug was boot priority.
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# 2026-05-08 PM: cdrom bus SCSI + containerDisk delivery. This
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# combination boots qemu cleanly and reaches OVMF, but OVMF
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# BdsDxe still hits "starting Boot0001 ... Time out" on the
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# cdrom — see HANDOFF.md / CODEX-STATUS.md "OPEN — ci1" for the
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# full diagnostic chain. virtio-blk disk swap was attempted as a
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# workaround but introduced a separate QEMU rootdisk flock issue
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# without fixing the underlying OVMF cdrom problem; reverted.
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# Operator decision needed for next architectural step (OVMF
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# custom build with extended timeout, KubeVirt version bump,
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# Hyper-V/VirtualBox-and-export, or BIOS legacy boot). The
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# containerDisk distribution pipeline (build/save/scp/ctr import)
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# is proven and ready to reuse for any of those.
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- name: windows-iso
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bootOrder: 1
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cdrom:
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bus: sata
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bus: scsi
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- name: rootdisk
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bootOrder: 2
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disk:
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@@ -430,17 +457,40 @@ spec:
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persistentVolumeClaim:
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claimName: ci1-rootdisk
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- name: windows-iso
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# Path B (2026-05-08): mount ISO from Synology NFS instead of
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# Longhorn Filesystem PVC. The Filesystem-PVC path was confirmed to
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# contain a valid bootable ISO9660 image but caused OVMF's
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# SATA-CDROM read window to time out:
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# BdsDxe: failed to start Boot0001 ... Time out
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# Block-mode DataVolume was attempted as Path A but blocked by CDI
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# v1.65.0's upload pod capability drop. NFS-mounted ISO bypasses
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# both issues. See win2025-iso-nfs-pv.yaml header for full rationale
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# and Synology layout.
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persistentVolumeClaim:
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claimName: windows-server-2025-iso-nfs
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# 2026-05-08 PM (Path C, CONTAINERDISK): the ISO is now packaged as
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# a KubeVirt containerDisk OCI image baked from
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# `FROM scratch ; ADD --chown=107:107 disk.img /disk/disk.img`.
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# The qemu user (uid 107) reads the ISO directly from a tmpfs view
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# of the OCI layer, bypassing both:
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# - Synology NFS export ACL (Path B failed: uid 107 denied at
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# directory level even with mode 0777, see memory
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# feedback_synology_iso_export_root_only_uid_107_denied)
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# - OVMF cdrom read-window timeout (Path A and Path B's SCSI
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# retry both hit `BdsDxe: failed to start Boot0001 ... Time out`
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# when the cdrom was backed by a PVC the storage controller
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# couldn't satisfy reads from fast enough).
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#
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# Image build (one-time, per ISO version):
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# 1. Copy ISO to disk.img, write Dockerfile
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# 2. podman build --tag localhost/win-server-2025:1.0 . (on noc1)
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# 3. podman save -o win-server-2025-1.0.tar localhost/win-server-2025:1.0
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# 4. SCP tar to all 3 RKE2 nodes (rke2-server, rke2-agent1, rke2-agent2)
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# 5. sudo /var/lib/rancher/rke2/bin/ctr -a /run/k3s/containerd/containerd.sock \
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# -n k8s.io images import /tmp/win-server-2025-1.0.tar
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# Standard FC pattern per `feedback_rke2_localhost_imagepullpolicy`.
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#
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# When a new Windows ISO version ships, bump the tag (1.1, 1.2, ...),
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# rebuild + redistribute, and update the image: line below in a new
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# commit. KubeVirt picks up the new image via a VM restart.
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#
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# The legacy NFS PVC + PV (apps/kubevirt-vms/win2025-iso-nfs-pv.yaml)
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# and CDI Longhorn PVC (`windows-server-2025-iso`) are RETAINED for
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# this commit so the prior states are recoverable. Once the
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# containerDisk path proves on a successful Windows install, both
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# legacy artifacts can be pruned in a follow-up commit.
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containerDisk:
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image: localhost/win-server-2025:1.0
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imagePullPolicy: Never
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- name: virtio-drivers
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containerDisk:
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# Pinned to v1.8.2 (latest stable as of 2026-05-08).
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